To expand on this: you don't need to manage them. You don't need to track their progress. You don't need a special team for them, or a 'head of open-source'.
You pay them a salary in the same way that you would pay a salary to eg. someone who you don't really have any work for, but don't want to see leaving for a competitor either: you add them to payroll and just let them do their thing.
They're already a maintainer so they know how to manage the project. There are no further expenses or organizational overhead for you.
Do you want to stop "supply chain compromises" as a company? Here's a very simple way to do so: pay a stipend to a maintainer of something you depend on.
You don't really need dependency tracking tools. You don't need to exactly parcel out the 'right' proportionate amount of money to every maintainer. All of that operational complexity is unnecessary.
It doesn't even matter *which* maintainer you pick, as long as it's one who isn't receiving a stipend yet, and you pay them enough to constitute a salary.
It will cost you exactly one developer salary. If every able company does this, the problem of supply chain compromises is solved tomorrow.
All you need to do is simply *do it*, and talk about it so that other companies will too.
synadm maintainers:
JOJ0 (repo owner)
Ascurius
JacksonChen666 (me)
now the more interesting part is availability in maintaining the project:
JOJ0: pretty busy IRL
Ascurius: no idea what happened to them. their matrix homeserver seems broken and they have done nothing on the synadm repo for maybe about a year.
JacksonChen666: I have been temporarily given the lead for synadm by JOJ0, and did a couple of things recently. so I'm active.
so synadm currently only has 1 active maintainer. the other 2 aren't really available.
*to either coming up with a defense-in-depth strategy that assumes layers will be compromised and protects what you specifically care about
or, equally reasonably, to something else that’s more immediate and important to your project (like more commonly exploited vectors, incident recovery strategies, or just generally improving your product!)
for everyone waxing poetic about the xz backdoor: please, please, _please_ remember that risk acceptance is as important to threat modeling as risk reduction / abatement
you’re not going to come up with a single, all-encompassing piece of security advice that works for everyone — security always is a balancing act between capability, risk, and potential outcomes
sometimes you legitimately have to accept that these kinds of things are possible and move on*
xz
@eater (This is basically a 'trusting trust' type of situation, except one we have plausible evidence for)
xz
@eater xz is a part of *the build process itself* in many cases - extracting source archives, that sort of thing. So it could have affected the source of other applications at any point in that process, in a way that's impossible to trace back.
So anything that has come into contact with xz at any point in its build or distribution process, while this new maintainer was involved, is now suspect. That's... a double-digit percentage of packages on a typical system, I suspect.
xz, gloating
@syn Yes, but not for the specific purpose of knowing what packages to rebuild if a backdoor were ever discovered
politiek
@WH Tja. Zo iemand hadden we dus min of meer, in Sylvana Simons, maar dat is geen witte vrouw die voor gevestigde belangen opkomt, en dus werd die in de media en publieke opinie geheel kapot gemaakt.
Deze tactiek werkt alleen maar op deze schaal als je je privileges al mee hebt en niet te ver van de gevestigde orde afligt. Wel radicaal klinken maar vooral niet radicaal zijn, zeg maar.
xz, gloating
@syn (It's kind of hard to classify these things because Nix is in a category of software where "benefits we didn't anticipate" are expected as a category, it's just not known which benefits they will be)
xz, gloating
@syn Yes, though arguably an accidental one, sort of - it's not really what the dependency system was *designed* for afaik, just a consequence of the design choices
Do you want to stop "supply chain compromises" as a company? Here's a very simple way to do so: pay a stipend to a maintainer of something you depend on.
You don't really need dependency tracking tools. You don't need to exactly parcel out the 'right' proportionate amount of money to every maintainer. All of that operational complexity is unnecessary.
It doesn't even matter *which* maintainer you pick, as long as it's one who isn't receiving a stipend yet, and you pay them enough to constitute a salary.
It will cost you exactly one developer salary. If every able company does this, the problem of supply chain compromises is solved tomorrow.
All you need to do is simply *do it*, and talk about it so that other companies will too.
@aral Quite by accident, I have found that some managers respond to describing quality checks and safety inspections as 'the paperwork that keeps the CTO out of prison' can change attitudes in several layers in the company in one go. Most project managers seem to realise that if the CTO is going to be incarcerated, they are going down with them.
Technical debt collector and general hype-hater. Early 30s, non-binary, ND, poly, relationship anarchist, generally queer.
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Strong views about abolishing oppression, hierarchy, agency, and self-governance - but I also trust people by default and give them room to grow, unless they give me reason not to. That all also applies to technology and how it's built.