Show newer

@hierarchon @iliana Oh yeah, I don't doubt that there are edgecases where this *would* have helped. There are some of those for most things.

What bothers me more is the outsized importance that people tend to place on it - for a while, everybody and their dog was talking loudly about how post-install scripts should be disallowed, as if that will solve all the dependency security issues overnight...

@noplasticshower @swelljoe (I get paid for auditing open-source dependencies, actually)

@hierarchon @iliana Thought in a similar vein: it makes no sense to get all suspicious about post-install scripts in a package manager; the purpose of the package manager is literally *to install software. That will run on the system.*

The malicious code could be anywhere, whether you allow post-install scripts or not really isn't going to matter...

most of my personal reactions to the xz thing today have been "this is almost the perfect crime and it's incredible it was caught this early"

I feel like this is another very painful reminder of the difference between the commons and a supply chain.

Show thread

@mcfly (Which can be a real cost; some developers are going to insist on dubious programming practices, and that means simply not being able to use or distribute their work.)

@mcfly $customer auditing involves everything that is part of the release, so also test files - an eval on anything related to a binary file would definitely be considered something that warrants suspicion and probably rejection.

Like, it's just a general rule of "if it's in the release, it must be explainable and possible to reason about". Google dependencies frequently get rejected because they do not meet this standard...

I think that that one rule alone - "anything that cannot be explained, cannot be accepted" - would prevent most attempts at backdoors, to be honest. At the cost of not tolerating needlessly bad code.

@mcfly I was thinking through whether this code would have made it through the dependency auditing process at $customer, and my conclusion was "no, it would not" - they have a policy that code that we cannot understand will never be approved, and this is basically why that policy exists...

The fun* part will be figuring out how to prove other stuff hasn't been backdoored. While fighting the cops and spooks who want to be able to backdoor things without us noticing.

Not the specific library, but the idea that compromising underpaid and burnt out open source maintainers is easier and cheaper than hacking a server.

Why is there always exactly one lemon in a bag that suddenly decides to become a biohazard.

boehs.org/node/everything-i-kn

I have begun a post explaining this situation in a more detailed writeup. This is updating in realtime, and there is a lot still missing.

#security #xz #linux

Show thread

Does everyone understand how much luck was involved in this exploit in #xz being discovered so quickly? And, what it tells us about the attacker?

This was a subtle and sophisticated attack implemented over _years_. The attacker was made a co-maintainer two years ago, and they made numerous innocuous-looking and seemingly unrelated changes over that time, sometimes through a second account, that eventually added up to a backdoor. Along with many innocent commits, too. #Linux

I'm not saying that it looks like someone has specifically targeted xz and played the long game by helping out a maintainer that was overworked and suffered from mental health issues

but it does look like someone has specifically targeted xz and played the long game by helping out a maintainer that was overworked and suffered from mental health issues

mastodon.social/@glyph/1121809

*ponders about how anti-virus software tends to all use the same FOSS archival libraries to quietly and automatically extract untrusted archives for scanning*

@technomancy @alilly My understanding is that the release tarball was easier to work with in some way because it needed less dependencies or something.

The details are unclear to me but I guess the release tarball came with some stuff pre-generated? (Which, uh, yeah)

Just finished writing my lengthy paper on how "Many eyes make all bugs shallow", time to check what's happening on the internet today

Yeah, whoever wrote that liblzma backdoor knew what they were doing. This isn't amateur work.

More thoughts on : it seems that the bootstrap code for the backdoor was hiding in difficult-to-understand code. I hope this prompts people to start taking code readability seriously as a security factor.

It's much harder to hide malicious code in code that's easy to understand.

Show older
Pixietown

Small server part of the pixie.town infrastructure. Registration is closed.