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One thing that the xz compromise also shows; simply having more eyes on something doesn’t make things inherently more secure.

Multiple distributions pulled the vulnerable xz updates. I doubt anyone really vetted the changes. I don’t blame distribution maintainers for that, they do a lot of work typically for free. But a lot of people have bought into the idea that getting your packages through a distro’s official channels somehow makes you safer. It probably helps with unexpected issues due to misaligned dependencies, but it does little for attacks like these.

In truth we got lucky that one person noticed some odd behaviour and decided to investigate.

To expand on this: you don't need to manage them. You don't need to track their progress. You don't need a special team for them, or a 'head of open-source'.

You pay them a salary in the same way that you would pay a salary to eg. someone who you don't really have any work for, but don't want to see leaving for a competitor either: you add them to payroll and just let them do their thing.

They're already a maintainer so they know how to manage the project. There are no further expenses or organizational overhead for you.

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Do you want to stop "supply chain compromises" as a company? Here's a very simple way to do so: pay a stipend to a maintainer of something you depend on.

You don't really need dependency tracking tools. You don't need to exactly parcel out the 'right' proportionate amount of money to every maintainer. All of that operational complexity is unnecessary.

It doesn't even matter *which* maintainer you pick, as long as it's one who isn't receiving a stipend yet, and you pay them enough to constitute a salary.

It will cost you exactly one developer salary. If every able company does this, the problem of supply chain compromises is solved tomorrow.

All you need to do is simply *do it*, and talk about it so that other companies will too.

I would very much like for the conversation around xz to focus on how corporations have neglected their responsibilities to fund the work and support the maintainer, instead of focusing on the trustworthiness of the previous maintainer

synadm maintainers:

JOJ0 (repo owner)
Ascurius
JacksonChen666 (me)

now the more interesting part is availability in maintaining the project:

JOJ0: pretty busy IRL
Ascurius: no idea what happened to them. their matrix homeserver seems broken and they have done nothing on the synadm repo for maybe about a year.
JacksonChen666: I have been temporarily given the lead for synadm by JOJ0, and did a couple of things recently. so I'm active.

so synadm currently only has 1 active maintainer. the other 2 aren't really available.

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Quest: Find a 5V power supply with suitable barrel plug

Event log:
find a 5V power supply with a barrel plug too small
find a 5V power supply with a barrel plug too big
find a 5V power supply with USB output

1am infodumping about optical fibers is completely normal and neurotypical, innit?

xz 

It occurs to me that a lot of distros probably have a lot of already-built packages that involved one of the suspicious xz versions in their build process, and I don't know that they all have the tooling to track which packages need to be rebuilt...

Do you want to stop "supply chain compromises" as a company? Here's a very simple way to do so: pay a stipend to a maintainer of something you depend on.

You don't really need dependency tracking tools. You don't need to exactly parcel out the 'right' proportionate amount of money to every maintainer. All of that operational complexity is unnecessary.

It doesn't even matter *which* maintainer you pick, as long as it's one who isn't receiving a stipend yet, and you pay them enough to constitute a salary.

It will cost you exactly one developer salary. If every able company does this, the problem of supply chain compromises is solved tomorrow.

All you need to do is simply *do it*, and talk about it so that other companies will too.

My heart goes out to xz. A single maintainer, who was clearly in a rough place with mental health, screaming out to the world for some help and additional contributions, and somebody shows up wanting to help. Could you imagine how happy that maintainer was? They were no longer alone.

And it turns out the only reason somebody wanted to help them was nefarious. I can’t imagine how they feel right now as everyone is blaming them. I hope they’re ok.

@aral Quite by accident, I have found that some managers respond to describing quality checks and safety inspections as 'the paperwork that keeps the CTO out of prison' can change attitudes in several layers in the company in one go. Most project managers seem to realise that if the CTO is going to be incarcerated, they are going down with them.

most of my personal reactions to the xz thing today have been "this is almost the perfect crime and it's incredible it was caught this early"

The fun* part will be figuring out how to prove other stuff hasn't been backdoored. While fighting the cops and spooks who want to be able to backdoor things without us noticing.

Not the specific library, but the idea that compromising underpaid and burnt out open source maintainers is easier and cheaper than hacking a server.

Why is there always exactly one lemon in a bag that suddenly decides to become a biohazard.

boehs.org/node/everything-i-kn

I have begun a post explaining this situation in a more detailed writeup. This is updating in realtime, and there is a lot still missing.

#security #xz #linux

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Does everyone understand how much luck was involved in this exploit in #xz being discovered so quickly? And, what it tells us about the attacker?

This was a subtle and sophisticated attack implemented over _years_. The attacker was made a co-maintainer two years ago, and they made numerous innocuous-looking and seemingly unrelated changes over that time, sometimes through a second account, that eventually added up to a backdoor. Along with many innocent commits, too. #Linux

*ponders about how anti-virus software tends to all use the same FOSS archival libraries to quietly and automatically extract untrusted archives for scanning*

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