Do you want to stop "supply chain compromises" as a company? Here's a very simple way to do so: pay a stipend to a maintainer of something you depend on.
You don't really need dependency tracking tools. You don't need to exactly parcel out the 'right' proportionate amount of money to every maintainer. All of that operational complexity is unnecessary.
It doesn't even matter *which* maintainer you pick, as long as it's one who isn't receiving a stipend yet, and you pay them enough to constitute a salary.
It will cost you exactly one developer salary. If every able company does this, the problem of supply chain compromises is solved tomorrow.
All you need to do is simply *do it*, and talk about it so that other companies will too.
@aral Quite by accident, I have found that some managers respond to describing quality checks and safety inspections as 'the paperwork that keeps the CTO out of prison' can change attitudes in several layers in the company in one go. Most project managers seem to realise that if the CTO is going to be incarcerated, they are going down with them.
https://boehs.org/node/everything-i-know-about-the-xz-backdoor
I have begun a post explaining this situation in a more detailed writeup. This is updating in realtime, and there is a lot still missing.
Does everyone understand how much luck was involved in this exploit in #xz being discovered so quickly? And, what it tells us about the attacker?
This was a subtle and sophisticated attack implemented over _years_. The attacker was made a co-maintainer two years ago, and they made numerous innocuous-looking and seemingly unrelated changes over that time, sometimes through a second account, that eventually added up to a backdoor. Along with many innocent commits, too. #Linux
More thoughts on #xz: it seems that the bootstrap code for the backdoor was hiding in difficult-to-understand code. I hope this prompts people to start taking code readability seriously as a security factor.
It's much harder to hide malicious code in code that's easy to understand.
About the #xz backdoor: please do *not* assume that if your SSH server is not affected, you are not affected by it at all.
A lot about this situation is still unclear, but what *is* clear is that this wasn't a drive-by attack - this was clearly a well-prepared long-term engagement, across many commits and messages by potentially multiple accounts.
That makes it very plausible that there are other backdoors that haven't been found yet, and that might affect you under different circumstances.
There's not much you can concretely do about that yet, but you should carefully watch developments around this situation.
nixos users: tracking issue for the xz exploit rollback is https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/pull/300028
In the process of moving to @joepie91. This account will stay active for the foreseeable future! But please also follow the other one.
Technical debt collector and general hype-hater. Early 30s, non-binary, ND, poly, relationship anarchist, generally queer.
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Strong views about abolishing oppression, hierarchy, agency, and self-governance - but I also trust people by default and give them room to grow, unless they give me reason not to. That all also applies to technology and how it's built.